NeuronFuzz

Automated LLM safety evaluation guided by the model’s internal neurons.

A safety research demo by SENTINEL.AI

Zhiyuan Xu · Muhammad Firhard Roslan · Joseph Gardiner · Sana Belguith · Lichao Wu

University of Bristol

arXiv:2608.26222
INTERNAL-SIGNAL FEEDBACK
01 · TOKEN MUTATIONInitial template
02 · PREFILL
03 · SAFETYORACLE0.72
Initial score
Initial template enters the guided search.
Score guides the next mutation
21text & multimodal models
76–100%source-model JDR
+48 ppmaximum gain
1.0response generation / discovery

WHY INTERNAL FEEDBACK

A useful signal arrives before the answer.

Response-level evaluation is expensive and often binary. NeuronFuzz reads a continuous signal from the model’s own safety-related activations during prefill.

01

Sparse outcomes

Waiting for a full answer makes every trial expensive, while refusal or success provides little guidance for the next rewrite.

02

An earlier signal

During the input pass, safety-related neurons already react to intent. Their activity provides a continuous direction before any answer is generated.

03

A guided search loop

NeuronFuzz locates influential template words, proposes safe-to-inspect rewrites, scores them during prefill, and updates the search tree.

01 · Response-level feedback

Many candidates, the same refusal.

Complete responses must be generated and judged before the fuzzer receives a sparse success or failure label.

02 · SafetyOracle feedback

Every candidate has a direction.

Continuous scores rank candidates and reveal which template words most influence the internal safety signal.

HOW IT WORKS

From an internal signal to a guided safety test.

The system learns a compact safety signal once, then uses it to choose, rewrite and score prompt templates without repeatedly generating full answers.

System architecture
The NeuronFuzz framework: SafetyOracle construction followed by a gradient-guided fuzzing loop.
Original aspect ratio preserved. SafetyOracle construction is offline, while candidate evaluation uses prefill-only feedback.
01

Build SafetyOracle

Learn a lightweight classifier from stable internal safety neurons that separate harmful and benign intent.

02

Choose a template

Select a promising branch from a pool of starting templates, balancing past scores with unexplored directions.

03

Rewrite sensitive tokens

Identify influential template words and propose fluent replacements while the safety-test payload stays locked.

04

Score before generation

Read the internal activation pattern during prefill, then return the score to the search tree.

THE SAFETY ORACLE

Explore the risk spectrum.

Move from ordinary assistance to increasingly risky request categories and see how an internal safety signal could be interpreted.

SafetyOracle spectrum0.50Elevated
ExampleRole-play framing jailbreak attempt

Framing suggests an attempt to weaken safeguards without exposing an actionable prompt.

Ambiguous manipulation pattern

INTERACTIVE PRODUCT DEMO

Inspect how one template evolves.

01 / EVOLUTION TREESee eight iterations at once

Click any node to inspect its lineage, token changes, oracle score and activation shift.

Iteration 8 snapshot loaded.

INTERACTIVE RESULTS

Explore the reported evidence.

Every value below is taken from the paper. Switch views to compare source-model discovery, zero-shot transfer, and multimodal transfer.

JDR: Jailbreak Discovery Rate · RGD: Response Generations per Discovery · ETD: End-to-end Time per Discovery · ASR: Attack Success Rate · EASR: top-5 Ensemble ASR

Plots showing an inverse relationship between safety alarm score and attack success rate on three models.
Continuous feedback predicts susceptibility. Spearman correlations range from −0.927 to −0.976.
Optimization trajectories for attack success, ensemble attack success, and safety alarm score over 20 fuzzing steps.
Optimization converges quickly. ASR and EASR improve as the mean safety alarm score falls.

SAFETY & DEFENSE

The same signal also supports detection.

Input perturbation reduces attack effectiveness but does not remove every vulnerability. The SafetyOracle can also identify likely successful jailbreaks before response generation.

Average AUROC0.956

Across three evaluated models

Average precision0.882

Successful-jailbreak detection

Average F10.890

At the reported threshold

TPR @ 5% FPR87.9%

Average detection rate

INPUT DEFENSES

Fluent mutations remain challenging to filter.

The perplexity filter reduces JDR by only 2–8 percentage points. SmoothLLM is stronger, reducing JDR by 11–29 points.

No defensePerplexitySmoothLLM

ABSTRACT

Internal signals as practical execution feedback.

Safety evaluation is critical for assessing whether aligned Large Language Models remain robust against jailbreak attacks. Existing automated testing methods largely rely on response-level feedback, which is expensive and provides sparse guidance on strongly aligned models.

NeuronFuzz is a white-box fuzzing framework that converts safety-neuron activations into a continuous safety alarm score during prefill. Its gradients locate sensitive template positions, while a masked language model generates fluent mutations that preserve the original payload. Across 21 text and multimodal models, the framework improves discovery and transfers across model families, proprietary APIs, datasets, and visual safety tasks.

CITATION

Cite NeuronFuzz

@article{xu2026neuronfuzz,
  title   = {NeuronFuzz: Safety Neuron Guided Fuzzing for LLM Safety Evaluation},
  author  = {Xu, Zhiyuan and Roslan, Muhammad Firhard and Gardiner, Joseph and Belguith, Sana and Wu, Lichao},
  journal = {arXiv preprint arXiv:2608.26222},
  year    = {2026}
}